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Abstract: This paper investigates the static and dynamic effect of inflation and economic 
growth on terrorism using annual frequency i.e. 1971-2010 in case of Pakistan. In doing 
so, ARDL bounds testing approach to cointegration has been applied while robustness of 
long run relationship is confirmed by using rolling window approach. The empirical 
evidence confirms cointegration between inflation, economic growth and terrorism in 
Pakistan. An increase in inflation raises terrorist attacks. Economic growth is also a major 
contributor to terrorism. Moreover, bidirectional causality is found between inflation and 
terrorism as investigated by VECM Granger-causality approach while variance 
decomposition also supports the findings by VECM analysis.  
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I. Introduction 
Many definitions of terrorism are available in economics but the most frequently used is a 
combination of three elements (i) use of extreme violence, (ii) nature of terrorist acts by 
individuals and organizations (Nasir et al. 2010), and (iii), publicity (Llussa and Tavares, 
2007). Terrorism is said to be known as the intentional exercise of peril and warning to 
practice violence by an entity versus opponents in order to achieve personal, social, 
economic and political gains by pressure of a significant addressee ahead of the actual 
and direct sufferers (Endler and Sandler, 1993, 2000, 2006). The components of terrorism 
comprise of bullying, violence and social, political and ideological aims. The terrorist 
attacks tend to be hit and miss as well as arbitrary to create strain in the atmosphere along 
with the addressees. This, in turn, leads the government representatives to connect with 
the terrorists and make a settlement (Yildirim et al. 2007). Despite the consideration of 
many aspects of terrorism in defence economics, the influence of terrorism has not been 
seen in terms of inflation as well as economic growth in case of Pakistan which has faced 
the most horrible terrorist activities in the world after 9/11.  
 
The objective of the study is to investigate the effect of inflation and economic growth on 
terrorism or terrorist attacks in case of Pakistan. Our findings show that a rise in inflation 
raises terrorist attacks and economic growth also contributes to increase the terrorism 
while causality analysis indicates bidirectional causal relationship between inflation and 
terrorists' incidents in the country. The study has four contributions in defence literature: 
(i) an effort to fill gap in defence literature regarding Pakistan, (ii) Clemente-Montanes-
Reyes (1998) and Zivot-Andrews (1992) structural break unit tests are used to check the 
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order of integration of running actors, (iii) rolling window approach is applied to test the 
robustness of long run relation between the variables established by ARDL bounds 
testing approach and direction of causal relation is investigated by applying VECM 
Granger-causality approach.  
 
Impact of Inflation on Terrorism 
Inflation plays a vital role in macroeconomics management. In the light of classical 
theory, it is argued that money supply or prices have no impact on the real variables of an 
economy. In real term inflation has no impact on resource allocations and economic 
efficiency under perfect competition as economy works at full employment level. Keynes 
discussed the influence of inflation under, over and above national income equilibrium 
due to monolopolistic behavior of the producer. High inflation in an economy may cause 
un-equalized allocation of resources. Earlier theories of inflation discuss the relationship 
between unemployment and wage rate. While in the favor of classical arguments’ 
Friedman (1960) argued that inflation is a monetary phenomenon and has no real impact 
on the macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, Mankiw (2003) pointed out that “most 
people earn their income by selling their services and labor costs rise with inflation 
therefore inflation does not itself reduce people’s purchasing power”. 
 
The real income or purchasing power of the people is determined by their productivity 
which in turn depends on the availability of physical capital, human capital, natural 
resources and production technology to be used for production process. On the other 
hand, nominal income is determined by inflation rate which depends on the growth of 
money supply. Inflation, caused by growth of money supply, taxes the society through 
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shoe-leather costs, anticipated inflation costs, men costs and may as well cause 
macroeconomic inefficiency in resources allocation. Theory of rational expectations by 
Lucas (1972) reveals that people may be temporarily confused in decision making 
regarding savings, investments, wages and income in real terms. The effects of an 
unanticipated expansion of money supply or price level works non-neutral. This situation 
may put pressure on the poor segment of the society by reducing their purchasing power 
and as a result they are further forced down the poverty trap (Dornbusch et al. 2006)1. In 
such an environment, poor are more vulnerable to rising inflation compared to elite class 
of the population. This creates problems for entire population but leaves the poor 
struggling to meet ends.  
 
Under such circumstances, the opportunity cost of life reduces making terrorism a 
plausible course of action for the poor to achieve necessary resources. In fact many will 
tradeoff their own lives to generate financial resources for their families2 which pursue 
them for terrorist acts. Many researchers have debated over many issues regarding 
terrorism in defence economics [Berman, (2003); Epstein and Gang, (2004); Glaeser, 
(2005); Charney and Yakatan, (2005); Berman and Laitin, (2005); Ferrero, (2006) and, 
Llussa and Tavares, (2007) but this particular issue i.e. effect of inflation of on terrorism 
is ignored in defence economics. This study is a humble effort to fill the gap and may be 
a good contribution in literature regarding case study of Pakistan.          
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Figure-1: Trends in Inflation and Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan 
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Pakistan’s economy is characterized by low economic growth (4.1%), high 
unemployment rate (15%) and high inflation rate (13.4%) in 2009-10. Improper planning 
and implementation of economic policies, deteriorating law & order and governance 
situation, deficit in balance of payments, high levels of nonproductive military spending, 
rising external and internal debt and high debt services on external debt have all inversely 
affected the economic growth.  
 
The high unemployment rate in the country is due to backwardness of agriculture (more 
than 90% population of village economy is involved in agriculture and related activities). 
The demand of unskilled labour in industrial as well as agro-related sectors has decreased 
due to adoption of advanced technology and there are lesser job opportunities for the 
unskilled labour. This situation has increased income inequality and hence poverty (more 
than 40% population is living below the poverty line) in the country. Governments have 
not paid due attention towards establishment of technical institutions to train unskilled 
labour. The government expenditure on security has been increasing since 2001 at the 
cost of development expenditures. Industrial sector has not contributed much to absorb 
the increasing rate of labour force due to electricity short fall in the country for last five-
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six years. In fact, electricity short fall has affected already established industry and the 
unemployment rate has increased. Moreover, low quality and high cost products by 
agriculture and industrial sectors have declined demand for goods and further contributed 
to increased unemployment and no attempt was initiated to overcome this crucial issue.  
 
Power shortages not only affected the industrial sector but distressed the economy as a 
whole. In addition, limited availability and high cost of basic production inputs i.e. 
electricity, natural gas and oil etc have closed many running industrial set ups. The 
corrupt tax system adds to the problems by not collecting sufficient revenue to spend on 
developmental projects. Historically the government has tried to fill budget deficit by 
increasing indirect taxes rather than direct taxes which declined investment and 
employment opportunities. Such an environment affected investment opportunities and 
international financial crisis further increased unemployment due to insufficient foreign 
direct investment. Fiscal policy has not been encouraging and monetary policy also 
played its role by increasing interest rates which raised the cost of loans resulting in 
decreased investment and increased unemployment rate.  
 
The population growth rate at1.8% is considered the highest in the region and is putting 
pressure on household income through increased demand. Inefficient legal system has 
allowed for hoarding and smuggling practices that has furthered the inflationary pressure 
in Pakistan. The rising prices of electricity, gas and oil also played their role to increase 
cost of production that further increased inflation. The coalition of Pakistan with USA to 
fight against terrorism affected fiscal policy and major chunk of resources, diverted away 
from developmental pool, are wasted due to security threats which further declined 
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production in the country and speed up the wave of consumer inflation. Rising inflation 
in Pakistan is attributed to insufficient investment, lack of industrial estates, adverse 
shocks in supply, capital shortage and market imperfections, low foreign direct 
investment and population pressure etc. 
 
II. Literature Review 
Existing literature provides various determinants of rising terrorist incidents in developed 
as well as in developing economies of the globe.  One school of thought by Gurr (1970) 
identified that poverty, income inequality and political violence are main determinants of 
terrorism while other school of thought lead by Tilly (1978) revealed that terrorism is 
increased due to rising violence and political opportunistic structure. Latter on, Muller 
and Seligson (1987) extended the models of Gurr (1970) and Tilly (1978) by 
incorporating income and land inequality and reported that high land inequality tends 
political violence that increases terrorists' activities. Similarly, London and Robinson 
(1989) explored that investment by multinational companies in developing economies 
have created high income inequality by generating more employment opportunities for 
skilled labor as compared to unskilled. This rising gap between haves and have-nots fuel 
violent behavior among the individuals and terrorism is increased.       
 
Schock (1996) developed a hypothetical model by combining the economic discontent 
and political opportunistic framework. The empirical exercise indicated positive effect of 
economic inequality and separatist potential on political violence and hence on terrorism 
in weak regions. Blomberg et al. (2002) argued that terrorists' attacks may be instigated 
by groups, discontented with the economic instability but are unable to transform 
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political violence. Apart from that, Fearon and Laitin (2003) also reported that terrorism 
is directly affected by poverty, political instability, rough terrain and large populations. Li 
and Schaub (2004) investigated the effect of trade variables on terrorism and noted trade 
openness, foreign direct investment and portfolio investment are also responsible for 
increase terrorists' attacks. Bravo and Dias (2006) tested the impact of Islamism on 
violence and, found that Islamization does not have impact on terrorism. On other hand, 
they noted that disparity in low human development index is also sources of terrorists' 
attack in economies where human development is low. It implies that economic 
deprivation is responsible for increase in terrorism.  
 
Some studies provided mixed empirical evidence on the relationship between repressive 
regimes or open democratic societies and terrorism [Li (2005), Kurrild-Kligaard et al. 
(2006) and Freytag et al. (2008)]. Li (2005) reported that the link between political 
freedom and terrorists' attacks is non-linear3.  Similarly, Muller (1985) investigated the 
non-linear relationship between regime repressiveness and violence and found U-curve 
effect of regime repressiveness on terrorism if income inequality is controlled through 
trickle-down effect. Muller and Weede (1990) suggested that political violence is higher 
in transitional period of regime oppressiveness while Collier and Hoeffler (2001) 
concluded that rebellion is increased due to provision of opportunities. Krueger and 
Maleckova (2003) unveiled the effects of supply and demand framework using primary 
data collection from 1357 Palestinians. They found that high educated individuals are 
inclined to take part in terrorist activities due to their family backgrounds and their 
interest to partake in politics. Therefore more educated and well-off persons are more 
 9 
interested to unite with Hezbollah. The demand-side hypothesis describes that terrorist 
organizations also prefer to recruit more educated persons with better skills. Similarly, 
Krueger (2008) confirmed the findings by Krueger and Maleckova (2003) by pointing out 
that educated individuals are happy to promote terrorist activities due to uneven 
distribution of economic growth.  
 
Interestingly, Abadie (2004) tested the effect of economic variables on terrorists' attacks 
and found that terrorism is not much affected by economic variables while political 
freedom is significantly associated with terrorism4. Testas, (2004) investigated the 
impacts of macroeconomic variables on terrorism by collecting data of Muslim countries. 
Empirical evidence indicated that education is positively linked with terrorism. A rise in 
per capita income is linked with decline in terrorists' attacks while relationship between 
repression and terrorism is U-shaped and dummy for war is also responsible to increase 
terrorism. Apart from that, Piazza (2006) examined the effects of population, ethno-
religious diversity and structure of party politics on political violence and noted that 
mentioned variables are determinants of terrorism5.  
 
There is an uninterrupted relationship between political violence and economic 
deprivation. For example, Li and Schaub, (2004) noted that economic deprivation 
increases terrorism. As Li (2005) concluded that economic growth through trickle-down 
effects and democracy through political freedom can control terrorist incidents. Similarly, 
Burgoon, (2006) suggested that spending on the well-being of people to alleviate penury, 
income disparity and economic uncertainty is helpful to condense terrorism. Kurrild- 
Klitgaard et al. (2006) identified that disparity in human development also promotes 
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terrorists' incidents. Apart from that, Bravo and Dias, (2006) pointed out that 
international trade is also responsible for rise in terrorism by increasing income inequality 
in more globalized regions of the world. Piazza (2008) examined the impact of 
democracy and state failures on domestic terrorism and reported that democracy and 
economic freedom do not have significant effect on terrorism while state failure is a 
strong predictor of domestic terrorism. Freytag et al. (2008) investigated the effect of 
socio-economic conditions on terrorism. They found positive impact of economic growth 
on terrorism while non-linear relation between economic growth and terrorism is inverted 
U-shaped. The negative correlation is found from investment to terrorism activities and 
education has inverse effect on political violence.  
 
In case of Asian economies, Nasir et al. (2010) found that on the economic front, relative 
deprivation represented by income disparity is the major cause of terrorism. On the other 
hand, people deprived of their political rights and civil liberties, exhibited by political 
repression, compel them to be involved in terrorist activities. Furthermore, findings 
indicate that high literacy rate is one of the foremost reasons for terrorism. Moreover, 
relation between repression and terrorism is inverted U-shaped while inflation has 
positive impact on terrorism. In case of South African countries, Lisanti (2010) 
investigated the effect of social and political factors and found that no significant 
association is found between economic development and terrorism while relation 
between democracy and terrorist attacks is vague and, high level of terrorism is found in 
the states which are engaged with military conflicts.  
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In recent wave, Caruso and Schneider (2011) investigated the effects of socio-economic 
determinants of terrorism and political violence in West European countries6. Their 
results pointed out that economic growth, inflation and unemployment are inversely 
correlated with terrorism while youth unemployment is positively lined with terrorist 
activities. Moreover, trade openness and long tern interest rate decline political violence 
and hence terrorism and an increase in investment activities increase terrorism. Further, 
Piazza (2011) contributed in defence literature by investigating the effect of poverty and 
monitory economic discrimination on domestic terrorism. Author found that a rise in 
minority groups and economic discrimination increases domestic terrorism and are strong 
predictors of terrorism as compared to poverty and economic development. Richardson 
(2011) checked the validation of relative deprivation theory as well as absolute standard 
of deprivation. The results indicated that higher levels of unemployment as well as 
population size and education lead an increase in terrorism that validates the existence of 
relative deprivation while education alone dose not seem to effect terrorism.  
 
The above discussion shows that only in two studies researchers investigated the effect of 
inflation (by taking an additional variable in their models) on terrorism and provided 
mixed results. Further, no consensus is found concerning causes of terrorism in Pakistan 
in terms of inflation and is main motivation for authors to fill the gap by investigating the 
impact of inflation on terrorists' attacks in presence of economic growth.   
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III. Modeling, Methodological Framework and Data Collection 
 
The Model 
The objective of the study is to investigate the effect of inflation on terrorist attacks in 
presence of economic growth. The growth variable is incorporated in the model to avoid 
the biasedness of results due to bivariate system. Economic theory i.e. immiserizing 
modernization theory indicates that economic growth can fuel terrorist activities if fruits 
of economic development could not be trickle-down to poor segments of population. The 
uneven economic growth raises income inequality and hence poverty1. High level of 
poverty lowers the opportunity cost for poor individuals. Such an environment favors the 
terrorist organizations to recruit poor individuals for terrorist incidents. This point is 
termed as economic deprivation by Gurr (1968). This shows that economic deprivation 
has positive effect on terrorism. On contrary, economic growth reduces political violence 
and hence terrorism if economic development declines income inequality and hence 
poverty by trickle-down effects.       
 
We have transformed the series into natural-log form to avoid sharpness in the data. 
Another advantage of natural-log transformation is that it directly provides elasticities. 
The log-linear specification provides reliable empirical evidence which can be helpful to 
control terrorism by reducing inflation and economic deprivation. Following above 
discussion, algebraic equation for empirical purpose is modeled as follows: 
tttt GDPINFTER µφφφ +++= lnlnln 221      (1) 
 
                                                 
1
 For more details (see Olsen,1963)  
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Where, tTER  indicates the terrorist incidents, tINF  is inflation and tGDP  is for economic 
growth and tµ is residual term assumed to be normally distributed.  
 
ARDL Cointegration 
To test long run association between inflation and terrorism in the presence of economic 
growth, ARDL bounds testing approach to cointegration developed by Pesaran and 
Pesaran (1997), Pesaran et al. (2000) and latter on by Pesaran et al. (2001) is applied.  
The bounds testing approach has numerous advantages over traditional techniques such 
as Engle-Granger (1987), Johansen and Juselies (1990) and Philips and Hansen, (1990). 
For instance, traditional approaches to cointegration require that variables to be used in 
the model must be integrated at unique order of integration. ARDL bounds testing 
approach to cointegration can be applied to investigate long run relation between the 
variables, if variables have mixed order of integration i.e. I(1) or I(0) or I(1)/ I(1). This 
approach is suitable for small sample data like in case of Pakistan to attain reliable 
results. Similarly, Laurenceson and Chai, (2003) pointed out that ARDL unrestricted 
model of ECM seems to take satisfactory lags that captures the data generating process in 
a general-to-specific framework of specification.  Moreover, a dynamic error correction 
model (ECM) can be derived from the ARDL model through a simple linear 
transformation (Banerrjee and Newman, 1993). The error correction model integrates the 
short-run dynamics with the long-run equilibrium without losing information about long-
run. The ARDL bounds testing approach to cointegration involves the unrestricted error 
correction method (UECM) of the ARDL model as follows: 
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The intercept and time trend components are shown by 
o
α ,
o
β ,
o
φ and Tα , Tβ  
, Tφ respectively. The next step is to estimate the F-statistic to compare it with tabulated 
critical values by Pesaran et al. (2001) to check whether cointegration exist or not. The 
null hypothesis of no cointegration in three models is 0=== GDPINFTER ααα , 
0=== GDPINFTER αββ and 0=== GDPINFTER φφφ . The hypothesis of cointegration can 
be test by hypothesis i.e. 0≠≠≠ GDPINFTER ααα , 0≠≠≠ GDPINFTER βββ and 
0≠≠≠ GDPINFTER φφφ . The decision is in favor of cointegration between the variables if 
calculated F-statistic is more than upper critical bound (UCB). We accept the hypothesis 
of no cointegration if lower critical bound (LCB) exceeds the calculated F-statistic. 
Finally, if calculated F-statistic lies between lower and upper critical bounds then 
decision about cointegration is inconclusive. The stability test is also conducted by 
employing the cumulative sum of recursive residuals (CUSUM) and the cumulative sum 
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of squares of recursive residuals (CUSUMsq) to test the stability of long-and-short runs 
estimates.  
 
VECM Granger Causality 
The confirmation of cointegration between the variables leads us to investigate the 
direction of Granger-causality between the variables. The Granger representation theorem 
suggests that there will be Granger causality in at least one direction if there exists 
cointegration relationship between the variables, provided that the variables are 
integrated of order one or I(1). Engle-Granger (1987) cautioned that if the Granger 
causality test is conducted at first difference through vector auto regression (VAR) 
method then it will be misleading in the presence of cointegration. Therefore, the 
inclusion of an additional variable to the VAR method such as the error correction term 
would help us to capture the long-run relationship. To this end, error correction term is 
involved in the augmented version of Granger causality test and it is formulated in a bi-
variate pth order vector error-correction model (VECM) which is as follows: 
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In this framework, difference operator is ∆  while m indicates appropriate and optimal lag 
length following Akaike information criteria (AIC). 1−tECM  is lagged residual term 
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obtained from long run cointegration empirical equations2. The residual terms are 
tt 21 , µµ and t3µ normally distributed having zero mean and predetermined covariance 
matrix. The VECM analysis provides three sources of causation if variables are found to 
be cointegrated such as (a) short run Granger-causality, (b) long run Granger-causality 
and joint long-and-short runs (overall) Granger-Causality. This is the main advantage of 
using VECM multivariate framework. The joint 2χ -statistic is used on the 1st difference 
lagged independent variables to test the direction of short run Granger-causality between 
the variables. 0
,12 ≠mB and 0,13 ≠mB , 0,21 ≠mB and 0,23 ≠mB and 0,31 ≠mB and 
0
,32 ≠mB indicate that Granger causality is running from inflation and economic growth 
to terrorism, from terrorism and economic growth to inflation and, from terrorism and 
inflation to economic growth respectively. The long run Granger causality is tested by t-
statistic of 1−tECM with negative sign. The short-and-long runs Granger causality is 
investigated by the significance of joint 2χ -statistic on lagged residual term and 1st 
difference lagged concerned independent variables. For instance, 0,0
,121 ≠≠ mβζ shows 
that long-and-short runs Granger causality is running from inflation to terrorism and vice 
versa. Same inferences can be drawn from other outcomes.  
 
The data on annual inflation ( tINF ) and real GDP per capita ( tGDP ) is collected from 
GoP (2010). The South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) is use to obtain data on terrorist 
incidents ( tTER ). The time span of the study starts from 1971-2010.  
                                                 
2
 If variables are not cointegrated then 1−tECM is not included in the model to be estimated for Granger 
causality.  
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IV. Findings and Discussions  
The descriptive statistics and pair-wise correlations are reported in Table-1. It is found 
that series of inflation, terrorist attacks and economic growth are normally distributed. 
The results describe that there is positive pair-wise correlation from inflation and 
economic growth to terrorism and negative correlation is found between inflation and 
economic growth.  
Table-1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
Variables  tTERln  tINFln  tGDPln  
 Mean  4.0189  2.1086  10.0378 
 Median  4.1743  2.1122  10.1130 
 Maximum  6.2499  3.2832  10.4477 
 Minimum  1.0986  1.0695  9.5491 
 Std. Dev.  1.3312  0.5458  0.2795 
 Skewness -0.2801  0.0756 -0.3491 
 Kurtosis  2.3406  2.6154  1.8776 
 Jarque-Bera  1.2164  0.2774  2.8394 
 Probability  0.5443  0.8704  0.2417 
tTERln   1.0000   
tINFln   0.0885  1.0000  
tGDPln   0.8305 -0.1504  1.0000 
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Before proceeding to ARDL bounds testing approach to investigate long run 
cointegration between inflation, terrorism and economic growth, it is necessary to find 
out integrating order of the series. ARDL cointegration approach can be applicable if 
variables are integrated at I(0) or I(1) or I(0) / I(1) i.e. mixed order of integration. The 
main assumption of ARDL bounds testing approach to cointegration is that variables 
must be stationary at level or at 1st difference if any variable in integrated at I(2) then 
computation of F-statistic becomes invalid to take decision about the existence of long 
run relationship. In doing so, we have applied three unit root tests i.e. ADF by Dickey 
and Fuller (1979), DF-GLS by Elliot et al. (1996) and Ng-Perron by Ng and Perron 
(2001) to ensure that no variable is integrated at I(2)3. The results indicate that series have 
unit root problem at level and found to be integrated at I(1). Baum (2004) argued that 
ADF, DF-GLS and Ng-Perron unit root tests provide biased results. The main reason is 
that these unit root tests do not have information about structural breaks occurring in the 
series.  
 
We have chosen two structural break unit tests to overcome this problem i.e. Clemente-
Montanes-Reyes (1998) de-trended and Zivot-Andrews (1992) trended structural break 
unit root tests and results are reported in Table-2. The main advantage of Clemente-
Montanes-Reyes unit root test is that it has information about two possible structural 
break points in the series by offering two models i.e. an additive outliers (AO) model 
informs about a sudden change in the mean of a series and an innovational outliers (IO) 
model indicates about the gradual shift in the mean of the series.  
 
                                                 
3
 Results are not reported but available from authors upon request. 
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Table-2: Clemente-Montanes-Reyes Detrended Structural Break Unit Root Test  
Innovative Outliers  Additive Outlier Variable 
t-statistic TB1 TB2 Decision t-statistic TB1 TB2 Decision 
tTERln  -5.339 1983 2005 I(0) -6.451* 1993 2003 I(1) 
tINFln  -3.049 1989 1999 I(0) -8.037* 1995 2001 I(1) 
tLGDP  -2.150 1984 1993 I(0) -6.149* 1990 2003 I(1) 
Note: * indicates significant at 1% level of significance. 
 
 
Table-3: Zivot-Andrews Structural Break Trended Unit Root Test 
 
At Level At 1st Difference Variable  
 T-statistic Time Break  T-statistic Time Break 
tTERln  -5.084 (0)*** 1986 -6.296(2)* 1991 
tINFln  -4.089(0) 1999 -7.809 (0)* 2004 
tLGDP  -3.361(1) 1993 -5.645(0)* 1993 
Note: * and *** represent significant at 1%, and 10% level of significance. Lag order is 
shown in parenthesis.  
 
 
The additive outlier model is more suitable for the variables having sudden structural 
changes as compared to gradual shifts. The results by Clemente et al. (1998) unit root test 
show that inflation, terrorist attacks and economic growth have unit root problem at their 
level form while variables have become stationary at 1st difference i.e. integrated at I(1). 
We prefer Clemente et al. (1998) unit root to make the base of results. The robustness of 
stationarity properties of inflation, terrorist attacks and economic growth in investigated 
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by Zivot-Andrews (1992) unit root test having information about one structural break 
exists in the series. The results reported in Table-3 show that variable have unique order 
of integration except terrorist attacks. 
 
Table-4: Lag Order Selection 
 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -61.64929 NA   0.007285  3.591627  3.723587  3.637685 
1  46.44947  192.1756  2.97e-05 -1.913859  -1.386020* -1.729629 
2  58.30656   19.10309*   2.56e-05*  -2.072587* -1.148867  -1.750184* 
3  63.35484  7.291968  3.29e-05 -1.853047 -0.533448 -1.392471 
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level) 
FPE: Final prediction error 
AIC: Akaike information criterion 
SC: Schwarz information criterion 
HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
 
 
The uniqueness in order of integration confirmed by Clemente-Montanes-Reyes (1998) 
unit root test leads us to investigate the long run relationship between the series by 
applying ARDL bounds testing approach to cointegration. To apply ARDL bounds, 
selection of appropriate lag length is necessary. It is pointed out that F-statistic is very 
much sensitive with lag order of the variables (Feridun and Shahbaz, 2010). Table-4 
reveals that we cannot take lag order more than 2 in case of Pakistani data.        
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The results of ARDL bounds testing are pasted in Table-5. The calculated F-statistics are 
8.775 and 5.030 greater than upper critical bounds at 5% and 10% level of significance 
when terrorist attacks and inflation are used as dependent variables. We have used critical 
bounds generated by Turner (2006). The critical bounds developed by Pesaran et al. 
(2001) and Narayan (2005) are not suitable for small sample data as in this case. Our 
analysis concludes that there are two cointegrating vectors which validate the existence of 
long run relationship between inflation, terrorism and economic growth in case of 
Pakistan for period of 1971-2010.  
 
Table-5: Cointegration Test: Bounds Test 
 
Panel I: Bounds testing to cointegration 
Estimated Models ),/( GDPINFTERFTER  ),/( INFTERGDPFGDP  ),/( GDPTERINFFINF  
Optimal lag structure (1, 2, 1) (2, 2, 1) (1, 1, 2) 
F-statistics 8.775** 4.754 5.930*** 
Critical values (T = 39)# 
Significant level 
Lower bounds I(0) Upper bounds I(1)  
1 per cent level 7.397 8.926  
5 per cent level 5.296 6.504  
10 per cent level 4.401 5.462  
Panel II: Diagnostic tests Statistics Statistics Statistics 
2R  0.6913 0.6745 0.4865 
Adjusted- 2R  0.5498 0.4141 0.1542 
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J-B Normality test  1.0096 (0.6036) 1.2701 (0.5298) 0.1739 (0.9166) 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test 0.3887 (0.6824) 2.2894 (0.1407) 0.2156 (0.8085) 
ARCH LM test 2.1822 (0.1298) 0.5225 (0.4765) 0.4781 (0.4954) 
W. Heteroskedasticity Test 0.8585 (0.5888) 0.5887 (0.8019) 1.6329 (0.1760) 
Ramsey RESET  1.2371 (0.2775) 0.0984 (0.7583) 1.1041 (0.3090) 
Note: The lag selection is based on AIC and SBC.  ** and *** denotes the probability and the significant 
level at 5% and 10% respectively.  
 
 
Table-6: Results of Test of Cointegration 
 
Hypothesis Trace Test Statistic 5% CV Hypothesis Maximum Eigen Value 5%CV 
R = 0  50.9761*  35.1927 R = 0  25.0097**  22.2996 
R ≤ 1 
 25.9664*  20.2618 R = 1  18.7049**  15.892 
R ≤ 2 
 7.2614  9.1645 R = 2  7.2614  9.1645 
 
 
Unit root analysis indicate that all series i.e. inflation, terrorist attacks and economic 
growth are integrated at I(1). This unique level of integration also leads us to use 
Johansen multivariate approach to cointegration for robustness of long run relationship. 
The findings show that there are two cointegration vectors between inflation, terrorism 
and economic growth in case of Pakistan for the period of 1971-2010 which confirm the 
robustness of long run relation.  
 
 
This study also applies rolling window bounds testing approach to cointegration to probe 
whether a cointegrating relation is stable or not. The theoretical and empirical literature 
was not given any confirmation to choose the rolling windows size. In order to capture 
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static and dynamic association between inflation, economic growth and terrorism, we 
take 13-years observations as a window size. Thus if the normalize F statistic is greater 
than one then cointegration exists and stable. Our results for rolling window approach to 
ARDL cointegration show that moving window size is 13 and ARDL model with 2 lags 
is estimated for ),( GDPINFfTER = , ),( GDPTERfINF = and 
),( INFTERfGDP = with unrestricted intercept and unrestricted trend. The upper critical 
bound from Pesaran et al. (2001) is 4.535 with k-1 (regressor) having constant with trend. 
The selection of the window size of 13-years is appropriate to justify that static and 
vibrant link between inflation and terrorism can be checked. The normalised F-statistic of 
),( GDPINFfTER = , ),( GDPTERfINF = and ),( INFTERfGDP = for each window 
can be visualized by the thick and straight line mentioned in Figure-2, 3 and 4. It is stated 
that if the normalized F-statistic is more than 1 (more than thick and straight line) then 
there is stable cointegration between the variables. The descriptive view of normalized F-
statistic of equation-2 is reported in Table-6. It is noted that cointegration relation 
between inflation, economic growth and terrorism is instable before 1998 and after 1998, 
there is stable long run relationship is found between the variables in case of Pakistan 
when inflation and economic growth are used as forcing variables. 
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The Plot of Normalized F-statistic for Rolling Windows Bounds Test 
Figure-1: Graph of ),( GDPINFfTER =  
 
 
Figure-2: Graph of ),( GDPTERfINF =  
 
 
Figure-2: Graph of ),( TERINFfGDP =  
 
 
 
Figure-2 indicates that cointegration between inflation, economic growth and terrorism is 
instable in 1993-94, 1998-2001 and 2008-10 and rest period shows the existence of long 
run relation between the variables when inflation is considered as dependent variable. 
There is no existence of stable cointegration when inflation and terrorism are appointed 
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as forcing variables. Table-7 reveals the descriptive view of rolling window ARDL 
bounds testing approach to cointegration which indicates that more than 1 normalized F-
statistic is 53.84% while less than 1 is 46.16.75% in terrorism equation i.e. 
),( GDPINFfTER =  which indicates overall stable long run association between the 
variables. In inflation equation i.e. ),( GDPTERfINF = , normalized F-statistic is 73% 
and 27% is found for more than 1 and less than 1, provides strong support for the 
existence of cointegration. Growth equation i.e. ),( TERINFfGDP = indicates high 
proportion of F-statistic is less than 1 revealing no cointegration between the variables. 
This exercise shows that long run results are robust. 
 
Table-7: Normalised F-Statistics 
 
Dependent Variable  
tTER  
Less than 1 12 46.16% 
More than 1 14 53.84% 
Total 26 100% 
 
tINF  
Less than 1 7 27% 
More than 1 19 73% 
Total 26 100% 
 
tGDP  
Less than 1 22 84.62% 
More than 1 4 15.38% 
Total 26 100% 
 
 
The regression results in Table-8 indicate positive affect of inflation on terrorism or 
terrorist attacks. It is noted that a 1 percent increase in inflation raises 0.52 percent 
terrorism and it is significant at 5 percent significance level. It is reported above that 
rising inflation reduces the purchasing power and increases poverty. Under such 
circumstance, the opportunity cost of life reduces and makes terrorism a plausible course 
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of action for the poor to achieve financial resources to maintain their life. In fact many 
will tradeoff their own lives to generate financial resources for the bereaved. This results 
an increase in terrorism. Rising terrorist activities have declined foreign direct investment 
in Pakistan. FDI has been declined to $ 910.20 million from $ 1.4 billion in 2008-09. This 
decline in foreign direct investment increased unemployment and poverty in the country. 
Terrorism promoted the smuggling, shattered the trust of investors, affected financial 
markets and increased military spending to fight against it.  
 
Surprisingly, the effect of economic growth is positive and statistically significant at 1% 
level of significance. These findings are contradictory with Nasir et al. (2010) while 
consistent with Caruso and Schneider (2011). Further, results show that a 1 percent 
increase in economic growth will raise terrorist attacks by 4.112 percent. This indicates 
that distribution of income in Pakistan is deteriorating day-by-day and increasing income 
inequality. This gap between “haves and haves not” in the country is linked with rise in 
poverty and hence with terrorism. This finding is contradictory with Nasir et al. (2010) 
who reported that an increase in income per capita is linked with decline in terrorism in 
South Asian countries while Muller and Seligson, (1987) argued that economic growth 
increases terrorism when economic growth does not benefit poor segments of population 
through trickle-down effect.    
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Table-8: Long Run Results 
 
Dependent Variable: tTERln  
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic Coefficient T-Statistic 
Constant  -38.3824 -9.0780* -46.3516 -0.2035 
tINFln  0.5327 2.5246** 0.5369 1.9845*** 
tGDPln  4.1122 9.9786* 5.7059 0.1260 
2ln tGDP  … … -0.0797 -0.0353 
Diagnostic Test 
2R  0.7365    
2RAdj −  0.7219    
F-statistic 50.3216*    
NORMAL2χ  0.6319 0.7290 0.6273 0.7307 
SERIAL2χ  0.4886 0.6176 0.4704 0.6288 
ARCH2χ  1.7961 0.1813 1.7677 0.1860 
WHITE2χ  2.4087 0.1040 1.6047 0.2058 
REMSAY2χ  0.0007 0.9782 0.0022 0.9625 
 
 
We also conducted several diagnostic tests to exhibit any evidence of violation of the 
classical linear regression model assumptions. The Jarque-Bera (J-B) normality test 
cannot reject the null hypothesis which implies that the estimated residuals are normality 
distributed and thus, the standard statistical inferences (i.e., t-statistic, F-statistic and R-
squares) are valid. Both Breusch-Godfrey LM test and ARCH LM test consistently reveal 
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that the residuals are not serially correlated and also free from heteroskedasticity 
problem. Functional form of model is well specified. 
 
Table-9: Short Run Results 
 
Dependent Variable: tTERln∆  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic 
Constant -0.0846 0.1657 -0.5105 
tINFln∆  0.6852 0.3031 2.2607** 
tGDPln∆  5.8332 5.5972 1.0421 
1−tECM  -0.8229 0.0860 -9.5589* 
2R     
2RAdj −  
   
F-statistic    
Short Run Diagnostic Tests 
Test Statistic Prob. value 
Jarque-Bera Normality Test 1.0027 0.6056 
Serial Correlation LM Test 0.8225 0.4487 
ARCH Test 2.0975 0.1393 
Heteroskedasticity Test 1.2732 0.2996 
Ramsey RESET Test 1.7119 0.2001 
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Table-9 is related to short run behaviour of forcing variables on regressand. It is noted 
that the ECM is between 0 and –1 and is statistically significant at the 1% significance 
level. This implies that, the error correction process converges monotonically to the 
equilibrium path relatively quickly. The coefficient of lagged error term is equal to -0.8229 
and its significance confirms the established cointegration relation between the variables. 
Further, it also implies that a deviation from the equilibrium level of tTER during the current 
period will be corrected by 96.87% in the future. In short run, terrorism is positively affected 
by rising inflation. It is opined on the basis of our results that a 1% increase in terrorism is 
linked with an increase in inflation by 0.68% and it is significant at 5% significance level. 
The effect of economic growth on terrorism in positive but it is statistically insignificant.   
 
The diagnostic tests such as LM test for serial correlation, normality of residual term, 
white heteroscedisticity and model specification have been conducted. The results are 
reported in lower part of Table-9. The empirical findings show that short-run model 
seems to pass all diagnostic tests successfully. It is noted that residual term is normally 
distributed. There is no evidence of serial correlation and autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedisticity. Furthermore, problem of white heteroscedisticity is not found and 
estimates of Ramsey Reset test indicate that functional form of model is not misspecified. 
 
The stability tests have been used to investigate the stability of long and short run 
parameters. In doing so, cumulative sum (CUSUM) and cumulative sum of squares 
(CUSUMsq) tests have been conducted. 
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Figure 3 
Plot of Cumulative Sum of Recursive Residuals 
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The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level. 
 
Figure 4   
Plot of Cumulative Sum of Squares of Recursive Residuals 
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The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level. 
 
 
Pesaran and Shin, (1999) have suggested to estimate the stability of long and short run 
estimate through CUSUM and CUSUMsq tests. The graphs of both CUSUM and 
CUSUMsq are presented above (see figure 3 and 4). The figure 3 and 4 specify that plots 
for both CUSUM and CUSUMsq are between critical boundaries at 5 % level of 
significance. This confirms the accuracy of long and short run parameters which have 
effect on terrorism in case of Pakistan. Moreover, both tests also verify the stability of 
 31 
ARDL model for structural stability i.e. there is no structural break. This indicates that 
model seems to steady and specified appropriately.  
  
After finding long-and-short runs' effect of inflation and economic growth on terrorism, 
next step is to investigate the direction of causal relation between the said variables. The 
detection of causality between the variable would help policy makers to control terrorism 
by declining inflation in the country. The application of ARDL bounds testing approach 
does suggest us about the direction of causality except cointegration. As Morley (2006) 
pointed that existence of long run association between the variables is considered as 
necessary but not sufficient condition to reject the non-causality hypothesis.  
 
Our empirical results reported in Table-2 indicated bidirectional causality between 
inflation and terrorism in long-and-short runs. This reveals that rising inflation reduces 
purchasing power of poor segments of population especially and rising terrorism shatters 
the trust of investors (both local and foreigner) and declines production level in the 
country while demand is rising day-by-day due to an increase in population and in 
resulting inflation is increased. The unidirectional Granger-causality is found running 
from economic growth to terrorism and consistent with Gries et al. (2011) who reported 
that economic growth leads the terrorist violence. Economic growth seems to Granger-
cause inflation to decline in long run by production-enhancing effect. The unidirectional 
short run causality is found running from terrorism to economic growth in short run. 
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Table-10: VECM Granger Causality Analysis 
Type of Granger causality 
Short-run Long-run  Joint (short- and long-run) 
tTERln∆  tINFln∆  tGDPln∆  1−tECM  1,ln −∆ tt ECMTER  1,ln −∆ tt ECMINF  1,ln −∆ tt ECMGDP  
Dependent 
variable 
F-statistics [p-values] [t-statistics] F-statistics [p-values] 
tTERln∆  – 
4.2813** 
[0.0231] 
1.5532 
[0.2281] 
–1.0278* 
[–4.7606] 
– 
9.3074* 
[0.0002] 
8.6365* 
[0.0003] 
tINFln∆  
6.7320* 
[0.0038] 
– 
0.0722 
[0.9304] 
–0.4087* 
[–2.9426] 
5.2489* 
[0.0050] 
– 
5.8139* 
[0.0030] 
tGDPln∆  
2.5727*** 
[0.0931] 
0.3171 
[0.7307] 
– 
–0.0033 
[-0.1007] 
1.9948 
[0.1360] 
0.2235 
[0.8793] 
– 
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It is argued by Wolde-Rufael, (2009) that Granger causality tests do not seem to 
determine the relative strength of causality effects beyond the selected time span. In such 
circumstances, causality tests are inappropriate because these tests are unable to indicate 
that how much feed back is existed from one variable to other. To examine the feedback 
from one variable to another and to check the relative effectiveness of causality affects 
ahead of sample period. We have applied Variance Decomposition approach to examine 
direction of causality between inflation, terrorism and economic growth following 
Wolde-Rufael, (2009). It is noted that variance decomposition is applied to investigate 
the response of the dependent variable to shocks stemming from independent variables. 
Variance decomposition method is an alternate of impulse response function. This 
process explains how much of the predicted error variance for any variable is described 
by innovations generated throughout each independent variable in a system over various 
time-horizons.  
 
The results are shown in Table-11 suggest that terrorism is explained 79.60% by its own 
innovative shocks while inflation and economic growth explain terrorism by 12.75% and 
7.64% through their innovative shocks. Inflation is explained 12.17% by terrorism and 
5.04% by economic growth and 82.78% portion is by innovations of inflation. This 
shows that contribution of economic growth to explain inflation is minimal. Finally, a 
33.39% portion is explained through innovative shocks of economic growth while 
inflation contributes to economic growth by 23.58% and terrorism explains economic 
growth 41.67% through their shocks.    
 34 
Table-11: Variance Decomposition 
 
 Variance Decomposition of tTERln  
 Period S.E. tTERln  tINFln  tGDPln  
 1  0.7584  100.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 3  0.8288  85.2188  8.1661  6.6150 
 4  0.8531  83.3255  8.5510  8.1234 
 5  0.8573  83.2468  8.5998  8.1532 
 7  0.8775  82.9392  9.0123  8.0484 
 8  0.8952  81.2116  11.0403  7.7480 
 9  0.8998  80.4386  11.8763  7.6850 
 11  0.9057  80.0278  12.3844  7.5877 
 12  0.9079  79.7649  12.6678  7.5671 
 13  0.9084  79.6747  12.7516  7.5736 
 14  0.9089  79.6311  12.7639  7.6048 
 15  0.9096  79.6011  12.7581  7.6407 
 Variance Decomposition of tINFln  
 Period S.E. tTERln  tINFln  tGDPln  
 1  0.4159  11.5191  88.4808  0.0000 
 3  0.5346  10.3270  87.4369  2.2360 
 4  0.5553  10.8974  85.0970  4.0055 
 5  0.5754  10.1577  85.1978  4.6444 
 7  0.5864  11.3575  83.5985  5.0438 
 8  0.5872  11.5090  83.4560  5.0349 
 9  0.5881  11.7679  83.2089  5.0230 
 11  0.5904  12.1860  82.7950  5.0188 
 12  0.5906  12.1753  82.7923  5.0323 
 13  0.5907  12.1743  82.7878  5.0377 
 14  0.5907  12.1755  82.7866  5.0378 
 15  0.5907  12.1781  82.7840  5.0378 
 Variance Decomposition of tGDPln  
 Period S.E. tTERln  tINFln  tGDPln  
 1  0.0156  3.1175  11.4903  85.3920 
 3  0.0278  2.9753  25.2783  71.7463 
 4  0.0323  10.0792  21.9269  67.9938 
 5  0.0366  20.4148  17.3500  62.2351 
 7  0.0435  32.7672  16.9737  50.2590 
 8  0.0467  37.1789  18.0652  44.7557 
 9  0.0496  39.5317  19.9761  40.4920 
 11  0.0534  41.1372  22.9137  35.9489 
 12  0.0547  41.6732  23.5865  34.7402 
 13  0.0557  42.0008  24.0752  33.9239 
 14  0.0565  42.1987  24.4054  33.3957 
 35 
 15  0.0573  42.4023  24.5750  33.0226 
 
The overall conclusion from results is that bidirectional causality between inflation and 
terrorism is confirmed as established by VECM Ganger-causality approach. It implies 
that results are robust. Economic growth is Granger-caused by terrorism and inflation. 
This result is contradictory with VECM findings may be due to different back grounds of 
both approaches.  
 
Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Terrorism is a very sensitive issue in Pakistan. Economic literature highlights various 
factors affecting terrorism. Terrorism hits the economy directly and indirectly by 
declining FDI, shattering the trust of local investors, affecting financial markets, lowering 
economic growth, rising unemployment and poverty. The present paper examined the 
effect of inflation and economic growth on terrorism which is ignored in defence 
literature in case of Pakistan.    
 
For this purpose, ARDL bounds testing approach and rolling window to cointegration 
have been applied. Order of integration of the variables is checked by employing ADF, 
ADF-GLS, Ng-Perron and Zivot and Andrews unit root tests. The direction of causality 
has been investigated by applying VECM Granger causality. The results show 
cointegration between inflation, economic growth and terrorism and the relationship is 
robust. Inflation raises terrorism while economic growth is also major contributor to 
terrorist attacks in the country. Bidirectional causal relation is found between inflation 
and terrorism while terrorism leads economic growth in the short run.  
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In the context of policy implication, government must take immediate initiatives to 
control inflation to save the economy from adverse effects of terrorism. Additionally, 
government should enhance employment opportunities in deprived regions of the country 
such FATA and Khyber Pukhtunkhawa (old NWFP) by encouraging investment 
activities. Fruits of economic growth must be trickled down to bottom segments of 
population. Rising corruption must be controlled through transparent accountability 
system. Proper implementation of macroeconomic policies should be ensured. 
Government should establish institutions which are responsible for employment 
opportunities, access to education, health facilities and to build goodwill between 
government and people.  
 
For further research, ignored variables such as democracy following Piazza (2008), 
unemployment (old and youth) by Richardson (2011), minority and regional economic 
disparity by Piazza (2011), financial and trade openness by Nitsch and Schumacher 
(2004) can be incorporated to examine the effect of proposed factors on terrorism. This 
can be more helpful for policy makers to formulate more comprehensive defence policy 
to control terrorism from its root causes in case of Pakistan.  
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Footnotes 
1. Bjørgo (2005) has also claimed that persistent level of poverty is also major 
reason of rising terrorist activities. 
2. Although there are many reasons of terrorist activities but it is also one of them 
ignored in defence literature.  
3. Hamilton and Hamilton (1983) noted that illiterate, poor, democratic and open 
societies are correlated with high terrorism. 
4. Abadie (2004) could not find any significant effect of economic development on 
terrorism. 
5. The hypothesis that countries which are most populated tend to generate more 
terrorism is validated by Krueger and Maleckova (2003), Burgoon (2006), Lai 
(2007), Plumper and Neumayer (2007), Freytag et al. (2008) and Piazza, (2008). 
6. France, UK, Northern Ireland, Spain, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, 
Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Switzerland and Sweden    
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